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DENTAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF
DENTISTRY: WILL STREAMLINING CREATE LEGAL VIOLATIONS?

Angelina Campin
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law

I. Introduction
Where do you look first when seeking a new health care provider? Some might log in to
their health insurer’s website of their health insurance; some might turn to Google; others might
search Yelp or other sites that provide user reviews. Regardless, many consumers do just what
they do when shopping for anything in this modern age: utilize technology. When it comes to
consumption in America, the Internet assists us in selecting everything from cars and clothing to
dentists, doctors, and other health care providers. Modern consumerism, informed by technology,
has changed what it means to practice medicine. 1
Fueled by the ease of comparison shopping, consumers have higher expectations when
purchasing most goods and services, including selecting providers in any field, and consumer
expectations of the dental and medical fields are not what they once were. 2 As a result, especially
with technological advances over the past few decades, people find themselves with access to
information about dental and medical practices and practitioners that had, in the past, been
unavailable to consumers. 3
This increased use of technology means that consumers of dental care are more
concerned with efficiency in making appointments and paying bills, immediate access to
information, clear pricing, and transparency when it comes to choosing a provider and a facility
to visit.4 All these factors create convenience for the consumer.5 Consumers of dental care are no
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longer as concerned with having a personal relationship with their doctor as they were prior to
the widespread use of technology. Instead, they seek validation of the dentist’s skills and
reputation from technological resources, as well as ease of access in making appointments and
paying bills.6 This increased consumer demand for ease of access and a stellar online reputation
has changed the type of dental service provider that can meet these sought-after standards.7
Keeping up with the increased demands for efficiency and technological advances presents a
challenge to sole practitioner dentists, which is the standard dental practice model.8 Dental
support organizations (“DSOs”) have seen an increase in popularity recently, especially over the
last five to ten years, in part to meet both the needs of dentists and the increased demands of
patients.9 DSOs are corporations that provide management support for dentists and dental
offices.10
Examining the body of case law beginning in 2002 regarding litigation against the
“OrthAlliance” chain of DSOs, decided in district courts across the United States, reveals how
DSOs intersect with the corporate practice of dentistry doctrine, 11 which is a subsection of the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The corporate practice of medicine doctrine says that
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corporations (in other words, non-individuals) are not authorized to practice medicine. 12 Penny v.
OrthAlliance, Inc. demonstrates that the analysis of whether a DSO is in violation of the
corporate practice of dentistry doctrine and its associated statutes is a fact-specific inquiry that
requires a close look at the contractual relationship between the owner-dentist and the
organization.13 In Penny, the dispute arose out of a breach of contract claim. 14 The contracts were
deemed to violate the corporate practice of dentistry based solely on what the contracts
established as the duties and rights of each party. 15 While a contracted relationship expressed in a
written agreement can indicate a legal violation, a more complicated issue arises when the scope
of the work being done indicates the legal violation. This means that instead of a situation where
the agreement violates the doctrine and statutes, the actual actions of the DSO are deemed to be
the practice of dentistry and, therefore in violation of the corporate practice of dentistry doctrine.
The central argument of this Note is that the DSO model and the increasing popularity of
DSOs could lead to more violations of the corporate practice of dentistry. More clarification and
regulation regarding contractual proceedings between dentists and dental service organizations
are needed to ensure compliance and to avoid future litigation. Part II of this Note provides a
general background on the classic sole practitioner dentist-owner model of practicing private
dentistry, DSOs, and the corporate practice of dentistry doctrine, a subdivision of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine. 16 Part III discusses Penny v. OrthAlliance, decided in the Northern
District of Texas in 2003. 17 Part IV is a discussion of the OrthAlliance DSO line of cases from
district courts across the United States and how they exemplify the fact-specific inquiry of
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violations of the corporate practice of dentistry that almost always arise out of contractual
disputes.18 Part V recommends increased regulation in the realm of DSOs for the protection of
patients and the public at large but acknowledges the important role that DSOs will play as
technology advances.19

II. Background
A. Classic Sole Practitioner Owner-Dentist Model
The classic model of practicing dentistry is that of a sole practitioner who is both the
practicing dentist and the owner of the business.20 In this model, a sole practitioner dentist owns
and runs a private practice, working directly with patients by performing hands-on dentistry and
employing a usually quite-small staff, often with no associate dentists.21 This structure of
business means that sole practitioner dentistry is a “cottage industry.” 22 Originally coined to
describe the type of manufacturing done out of workers’ homes prior to the Industrial Revolution
of the eighteenth century, this term now refers to any industry characterized by a small number
of employees, smaller worksites, and skilled labor. 23 The size of dental practices has not changed
much in the last twenty years, and sole practitioner owner-dentists continue to dominate the field
of dentistry.24
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Owner-dentists are generally not trained business professionals.25 That results in an
individual who is not trained in running a business being held solely accountable for every aspect
of a dental practice, including hiring and training employees, payroll tasks, ordering supplies,
and all other pertinent business duties. 26
The solo practitioner private dental practice has been the standard for some time and
remains the default model.27 Even while the traditional owner-dentist model to date remains
dominant in the field, the market share of DSOs has rapidly expanded since their introduction in
the 1990s.28 This increase in DSOs is causing many solo practices to struggle with keeping
market share.29 The American Dental Association reports that practice ownership among dentists
continues to decline every year..30 Despite this decline, only 7.4% of all dentists practice at
DSOs.31 In contrast to this low overall percentage, sixteen percent of dentists between the ages of
twenty-one and twenty-four practice at DSOs, which indicates that the popularity of these
employment structures is on the rise with younger dentists.32 Many dentists are changing their
mode of practice over time and considering the long-term management success a DSO may
offer.33 However, proponents of the classic model argue that a lack of corporate interference is
the best model for patient-doctor relationships.34
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B. Dental Service Organizations
For the past two decades, “vertical consolidation” of physicians has occurred, in which
larger corporate hospitals purchase smaller private practices and employ the physicians from
these private practices.35 Being employed by a larger corporate structure like a hospital could be
an ideal situation for physicians for many reasons, including reducing the doctor’s responsibility
for operations or administrative tasks, providing income security, and improving office
organization in a steadily more complicated and technology-driven health care market.36 These
are appealing reasons that apply equally to the dental field and may be even more beneficial for
dentists than for physicians. 37 This appeal may be attributed to increased dental education costs,
the financial cost of which would become even more significant when investing money to
purchase a practice, considering the rising prices of practice ownership. 38 Additionally, this
situation offers the opportunity to gain real-life dental experience while working for a larger
corporation that can alleviate the dentist from administrative and managerial tasks.39
According to the Association of Dental Support Organizations, DSOs contract directly
with dental practices to provide management, much like the vertical consolidation of
physicians.40 This model can provide security for practicing dentists in the form of
administration, compensation, networking, and technology advances.41 Many of these
advantages are advertised by the DSO industry, promoting itself as providing much-needed
support for the work of dental providers, focusing on the management, administrative, and
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business responsibilities of these providers.42 Most information available to the public about
DSOs reads like a sales pitch for why they are the better approach to providing dental care.43
There is little non-biased literature about DSOs and their functionality, but there is some
statistical support for their actual effectiveness. For example, in a multi-year study, the DSO
“Kool Smiles” was shown to be more efficient in its operations than a traditional owner-dentist
model, decreasing the cost of operation of the dental practice while increasing Medicaid
reimbursements.44 Kool Smiles focused on retaining patients for regular dental visits to decrease
needed restorative care, which offers a significant improvement in oral health for patients and
saves the doctors time spent so that they could see an increased number of patients.45
The significance of these effects may increase as dentistry in the twenty-first century
becomes an increasingly strong sector of primary care.46 This would allow a dentist-owner and
their staff to expand their responsibilities, performing additional tasks to provide care and
evaluations beyond traditional oral health, such as cancer screenings, complete smile makeovers,
and advising on the connection between oral health and other health concerns.47 With the
increased workload of providing services beyond the scope of what might be seen as traditional
dentistry, DSOs could be a solution to the challenges that solo practitioners face.
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C. Corporate Practice of Dentistry
Historically, corporations were not permitted to engage in “learned professions” such as
health care through the employment of licensed professionals except pursuant to specific
statutory or regulatory exceptions.48 This prohibition is often referred to as the “corporate
practice of medicine doctrine.”49 Cases applying a common-law prohibition on corporate practice
have addressed health care fields like medicine, dentistry, optometry, and chiropractic. 50
The body of corporate practice of medicine case law was codified in many states under
state statutes to bring liability to corporations practicing medicine without proper licensing.51
Statutes regulating the corporate practice of dentistry are an area of state law. 52 A Washington
state statute provides an example of the regulation of the corporate practice of dentistry,
explaining that no corporation can practice dentistry nor can it solicit “dental patronage” for any
dentists employed by a corporation. 53 To determine whether an illegal business relationship
between a licensed dentist and a corporation exists under Washington law, courts consider two
factors in tandem: (1) the extent to which the corporation exercises control over the
dental practice's operations, and (2) the nature of the payment scheme between the practice and
the corporation.54
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State v. Bailey Dental Co., 234 N.W. 260, 262 (Iowa 1931).
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 759 A.2d 894, 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
50
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dentistry); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 A.2d at 900 (prohibiting the corporate practice of
chiropractic); Ezell v. Ritholz, 198 S.E. 419, 424 (1938) (prohibiting the corporate practice of optometry).
51
JIM MORIARTY & MARTIN J. SIEGEL, SURVEY OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING THE CORPORATE
PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY 1 (2012), http://www.moriarty.com/content/documents/ml_pdfs/
cpmd_4.10.12.pdf.
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Similarly, an Illinois statute bans the practice of dentistry by a corporation and expands
on that ban by listing other ways that a corporation might violate the statute.55 For example, not
permitting corporations to “furnish dental services or dentists, or advertise under or assume the
title of dentist or dental surgeon or equivalent title, or furnish dental advice for any
compensation, or advertise or hold itself out with any other person or alone, that it has or owns a
dental office or can furnish dental service or dentists, or solicit through itself, or its agents,
officers, employees, directors or trustees, dental patronage for any dentist employed by any
corporation.”56
Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison was a foundational case for establishing violation of
the corporate practice of dentistry doctrine.57 In this case, a dental corporation alleged that a
dentist had breached a contract with the corporation.58 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the contractual breach charges on the grounds that the corporation was in violation of Section
18(a) of the Dental Practice Act of 1933. 59 The case discussed the reasoning of the corporate
practice of dentistry doctrine, explaining that professional licensing to practice in a field such as
dentistry requires “good moral character” for which “no corporation can qualify.” 60 A
corporation cannot qualify because a corporation is an entity without the ability to have honesty,
conscience, or loyalty, unlike an individual. 61
Prior to the subject case, OrthAlliance was involved in a lawsuit, Orthodontic Affiliates v.
OrthAlliance, which exemplifies the type of DSO contracts that do not violate the doctrine.62
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225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/44.
Id.
57
Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799 (Ill. 1935).
58
Id. at 799.
59
Id. at 799-800.
60
Id. at 800.
61
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Orthodontic Affiliates, P.C. v. OrthAlliance, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
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This decision turned on the careful drafting of the contractual agreements between Orthodontic
Affiliates and OrthAlliance, indicating that the defendant was explicitly not to engage in the
practice of dentistry, subject to local rules and ordinances.63 This case focused on the face of the
contract, utilizing its literal language to determine the relationship between the parties.64 The
focus on contractual language, as opposed to the actual behavior of the parties, is a theme
throughout lawsuits involving the corporate practice of dentistry.

III. Subject Opinion: Penny v. OrthAlliance
The subject case, Penny v. OrthAlliance, focuses on the contractual relationships between
the DSO and the owner-dentists in implicating the corporate practice of dentistry. 65 In their
lawsuit, the plaintiffs, all licensed orthodontists in Texas, alleged that OrthAlliance had failed to
perform its contractual duties and sought summary judgment indicating that their agreements
were invalid because the agreements constituted the unauthorized practice of dentistry. 66 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that the contracts taken as a
whole were illegal because the contracts violated the corporate practice of dentistry statute. 67 The
court reasoned that the contractual language indicated that OrthAlliance owned, operated, and
maintained the offices and employed and engaged the dentists. 68
The contractual issues that implicated the violation of the corporate practice of dentistry
included ownership, operation, maintenance, employment, and engagement. 69 The purchase and
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Id. at 1060-61.
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65
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66
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sale agreements between the orthodontists and OrthAlliance transferred the “tangible assets” of
the orthodontic offices to OrthAlliance, which the court interpreted as ownership.70 The service
agreements created an obligation for OrthAlliance to both maintain and operate the offices, and
the employment agreements employed the plaintiffs for a minimum term of 5 years after
purchase.71 The employment agreements were made between the plaintiffs and their practice
groups, but the service agreement required that the practice groups have this minimum
employment term stipulation. 72 The court held that the contracts were unenforceable as a way of
“circumventing” the unauthorized practice statute and deemed it to be a violation. 73 In totality,
the contracts were illegal because they violated the statute and were therefore void. 74

IV. Analysis
Generally, most judicial decisions that implicate the corporate practice of dentistry are
those surrounding contractual disputes between corporations and practicing dentists.75 Therefore,
these decisions often need a careful analysis of contractual language in the agreements between
corporations and practicing dentists. 76 Examples of contractual disputes exist not only in cases
throughout the country for the last fifty years but also in the line of litigation against
OrthAlliance, which all arose from contractual disputes.77 The history of such cases indicates
70

Id. at 582.
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75
See Choong H. Lee, DMD, PLLC v. Thaheld/Lee-01, LLC, 179 Wash. App. 1047, 1047 (2014); OCA,
Inc. v. Hodges, 615 F. Supp. 2d 477, 480 (E.D. La. 2009); Orthodontic Centers of Illinois, Inc. v.
Michaels, 403 F. Supp. 2d 690, 692 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799,
799 (Ill. 1935).
76
See Choong H. Lee, DMD, PLLC, 179 Wash. App. at 1047; OCA, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 480;
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77
See generally OrthAlliance, Inc. v. McConnell, No. CIV.A. 8:08-2591-RBH, 2010 WL 1344988
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2010); Engst v. OrthAlliance, Inc., No. C01-1469C, 2004 WL 7092226 (W.D. Wash.
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that to avoid implicating statutory violations, dental support organizations may simply alter how
agreements and contracts are written and executed. The danger in altering a contract to avoid
litigation, rather than altering procedures, is that it can undermine the purpose of the corporate
practice of medicine doctrines, which exists to protect patients. 78 The ability of corporations and
individuals to possibly circumvent the policy reasoning of the doctrine and statutes themselves
indicates that increased regulation in the field may be the best solution. Increased regulation
would ensure patient safety as well as give dentists and other health professionals the ability to
upgrade their practices to succeed in accordance with the changing standards of the new
consumer generation.
A. Continuing Litigation Against OrthAlliance
The litigation that followed Penny shows that there is a possibility that DSOs will be able
to track what contractual language illegally violates the corporate practice of dentistry and
associated statutes. By tracking this unenforceable contractual language, DSOs would be able to
modify their agreements accordingly to avoid prosecution under the statutes. However, this may
not entirely prevent the actual corporate practice of dentistry from occurring.
In Engst v. OrthAlliance, Inc., decided in Washington just a year after Penny, the court
examined and analyzed the agreements between OrthAlliance and the plaintiffs and similarly
found that OrthAlliance violated the Washington state statute against the corporate practice of
dentistry.79 The purchase and sale agreements and personal guaranties involved ownership issues

Mar. 1, 2004); Clower v. OrthAlliance, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2004); Penny v.
OrthAlliance, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 579 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Orthodontic Affiliates, P.C. v. OrthAlliance,
Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (N.D. Ind. 2002).
78
Dalton, Dalton, Little, Inc. v. Mirandi, 412 F. Supp. 1001, 1006 (D.N.J. 1976).
79

Engst., No. C01-1469C, 2004 WL 7092226, at *3.
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that implicated the doctrine. 80 According to the contracts, the list of services that OrthAlliance
was to be responsible for were: “providing office facilities and equipment, personnel and payroll,
business systems, procedures and forms, purchasing and inventory control, accounting services
and financial reporting, legal services, marketing assistance, planning for the opening of offices
in new locations, billing and collection services, payment and disbursement of funds, and
recordkeeping.”81 The court indicated that this went well beyond the scope of general office
management, especially portions of the DSO’s responsibility that included advisory roles, such
as language that OrthAlliance would “consult with and advise the Orthodontic Entity on its
equipment and office needs and the efficient configuration of its office space.” 82 The court
specifically pulled this language that triggered the statutory violations, demonstrating that future
contracts made by this DSO in the state of Washington could avoid that specific language and,
therefore in theory, evade the statutory violation.
In Clower v. OrthAlliance, Inc., the court held that OrthAlliance did not commit the
unlawful practice of dentistry. 83 The court determined that the employment agreements between
the DSO and the plaintiff clearly showed that the DSO was not the plaintiff’s employer.84 In this
case, the court referred to the other OrthAlliance litigation, indicating that the body of case law
does not follow a “clear pattern,” but instead that the inquiry is “dependent on the specific state
laws in question.”85 The court declared this but then did not proceed to analyze the behavior of
OrthAlliance as the literal practice of dentistry under Georgia law (i.e., examining or performing
certain dentistry actions in a human’s oral cavity) but rather once again analyzed the contractual

80

Id. at *9.
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82
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83
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84
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relationship between the plaintiff and OrthAlliance to determine whether OrthAlliance employed
the plaintiff.86 The inquiry examined the contractual language to decide whether the DSO had
control over the plaintiff’s actions as an orthodontist, including termination of employees and the
course of treatment for patients.87 The court ruled that the structure of the contracts clearly
showed that the plaintiff retained enough control over his position as an orthodontist and that the
DSO was not employing him, meaning the contract was not illegal. 88
Finally, in OrthAlliance, Inc. v. McConnell, the court determined that the contracts
entered into between OrthAlliance and the plaintiff allowed OrthAlliance to assert too much
control over the business to be enforceable. 89 The structure of the business relationship allowed
OrthAlliance to share in the profits of the business, employ and train staff, run payroll, control
office space, and hire new orthodontists. 90 While the agreements expressly stated that the DSO
was not practicing dentistry, other provisions showed that the control of the DSO was too
integral to the structure of the business and, therefore, the contracts were illegal. 91 The court
reasoned that the issue with a DSO having control over a business supposedly owned by a dentist
or an orthodontist is that the DSO’s interest in the business would affect the dental professional’s
first and foremost responsibility: the patients. 92 The DSO’s interest in the business’s profitability
and its stranglehold over how the business is run would, in theory, negatively impact the
motivations and actions of the owner-dentist.93
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The Orthoalliance cases reveal that the motivation behind investigating the corporate
practice of dentistry is often to simply rule on the legality of a contractual relationship as a basis
of a contractual dispute.94 The legality of the contract in terms of the corporate practice of
dentistry is the threshold question required before the court analyzes the crux of the cases:
contractual breach.95
B. Policy Issues and Increased Regulation
As evidenced by the Orthalliance line of cases, the form of approaching violations is that
of examining contractual disputes. The fact-specific inquiry courts generally use only implicates
the doctrine of the corporate practice of dentistry when discussing a contractual dispute. One
argument asserts that this way of approaching violations of such statutes is the best option: only
question the relationships between corporations and their owner-dentists when a contractual
dispute arises. Only questioning these relationships after a contractual dispute arises raises two
problems: (1) this method does not pre-emptively seek out those that are illegally practicing
dentistry; and (2) this method ignores the actual policy reasoning behind the corporate practice of
dentistry doctrine. The corporate practice doctrine is meant to protect patients, not those who are
parties to contracts. 96 A medical professional’s first obligation is to the patients, and the overinvolvement of corporations can influence a doctor’s or dentist’s professional judgment when
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See generally Id. at *3; Engst v. OrthAlliance, Inc., No. C01-1469C, 2004 WL 7092226 (W.D. Wash.
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diagnosing and treating these patients by encouraging them to go against their better judgment to
better the position of the corporation.97
Instead of attempts to apprehend violations of the corporate practice of dentistry through
individual contractual disputes as they arise, increased regulation is needed in the field of
contractual relationships between DSOs and dental service providers. This increased regulation
should focus on protecting patients as a goal. Increasing regulations should not necessarily
discourage DSOs and dentists from entering into relationships with each other, as the regulatory
landscape is already unfavorable to increased involvement of non-dental care providers in
owning and operating dental practices.98 Instead, increasing regulation should involve specificity
and control in ways that make the legality and regulation of these relationships easier. 99 The first
step may be increased control over the way contracts are drafted. Still, regulations should
ultimately control the actual actions and the relationship between the dental provider and the
organization. The most critical areas of this control should focus on the employment relationship,
profit margins, and profit-sharing. Dentists and DSOs should be sure they are not in a structure
where the DSO employs the dentist and where the DSO engages in a profit-sharing structure.
These two areas increase the risk that dental service providers will be less motivated by patient
care and more motivated by the DSO’s bottom line.
Such regulation is essential because individual patients may not have standing to bring
complaints against DSOs without individualized harm under the relevant state statutory
provisions.100 Therefore, it may not be possible for the community to assist in keeping DSOs in
line in terms of not practicing dentistry because until a DSO practicing dentistry harms a patient,
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the patient would be unable to bring a claim against the DSO. Instead, the case-by-case
contractual analysis may be necessary until a patient is harmed. Therefore, increased regulation
is likely the best path, as it would help control the issues of patient harm before they happen.
Increased regulation would mean that these issues could be solved without having to wait for a
contractual dispute and then having a court make an individualized contractual inquiry in every
situation involving a DSO.
Ultimately, when regulating this professional area, lawmakers must weigh benefits to the
patient versus detriments. The general consensus on whether DSOs benefit patients seems to be
yes, they do. If DSOs make health care better for patients, then they should remain a large part of
the dental health industry, and regulations should encourage their ability to do so. DSOs allow
practices to function better in all three of the important categories when it comes to health care:
access, cost, and quality. 101 They increase access to dental care because they often purposefully
install locations in rural areas that have no available dental facilities and specifically seek the
ability to perform charitable acts such as mission trips to provide dentistry to these so-called
“dentistry deserts.”102 This triad of benefits is beneficial for the public at large if DSOs can
operate within their state. 103 Therefore, it is within the interest of the state and its citizens if
DSOs can function without risking violation of the corporate practice of dentistry statutes.
Hence, increased control over these contractual agreements could be seen as a positive for DSOs.
It is in the public’s best interest for DSOs to avoid practicing dentistry, not only to protect
themselves legally and to provide better health care for patients, but also so that DSOs can
continue to operate. In addition, the continued operation of DSOs can help with other public
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health problems. Often, the quality of care of government-reimbursed health care programs is not
as high as that of private insurers. 104 The reason is that government reimbursed health care
programs such as Medicaid have low reimbursement rates and more responsibilities when it
comes to administrative work, such as paperwork.105 In a classic sole practitioner model, the
office staff may have difficulty dealing with these issues, and the owner-dentist can lose money
with each patient seen. 106 The situation can lead to decreased quality of care for Medicaid
patients.107 Because DSOs operate with an efficiency that is not possible for a sole practitioner
office, they can more easily cope with Medicaid challenges and therefore provide better care for
these patients.108
Despite all of these benefits, it still appears that at least fifty percent of dental practices
will remain in their current model into the foreseeable future.109 This could ultimately be the best
decision for those dentists who do not wish to become part of the corporate structure of a DSO
and prefer to practice dentistry in the classic model in order to own their own business and
control decision-making.110 The question then becomes whether the solo model will continue to
be competitive with the emergence of DSOs and whether an increasing number of patients will
begin to choose DSOs over sole practitioner models because of the ease of access offered.
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V. Conclusion
It may very well be true that an increase in the involvement of DSOs in the dental health
industry will lead to more litigation regarding the corporate practice of dentistry and violations of
the state statutes. In apprehension of this increase, increased regulation is needed over the
contracts between DSOs and owner-dentists. Where that regulation should come from is up for
debate: Should state dental boards govern the industry, or should the state itself take the lead
role? Regardless of where this control or advice comes from, establishing a fixed set of rules by
which the contractual relationship must abide will help avoid disputes in the future. Ultimately,
dentists should not be anchored to the wishes of a corporation so that they can act in the best
interest of their patients, which is why these state statutes were put into place. Despite the
increase of technology and efficiency in medicine, it is important to remember what health care
is all about: real people and their health.
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